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LEAHY—SHARPENING THE BLADE
Nandor F.R. Kiss*
ABSTRACT

Over the course of the last 20 years, the Leahy Law has become one
of the cornerstones of foreign and human rights policy. Yet, despite
its largely unchallenged importance, field practitioners and other
stakeholders have identified a number of substantive and practical
deficiencies that greatly diminish the law’s ability to achieve the
desired effect, and worse, may pose a risk to the United States’
interests. In reflecting on these deficiencies, and armed with
decades of data and anecdotal evidence, this Article proposes
adjustments focused on better aligning the law’s intent and effect.
These recommendations range from semantic edits to substantive
policy changes which may affect the way that Leahy operates in
substantial ways. We should not fear revisiting the original
intentions now that we have seen how the law operates. Like all
things, the Leahy Law must be continually improved or it risks
becoming an empty remnant of its former self. America needs to be
a world leader in the area of human rights, but it requires functional
tools in order to do so. Congress needs to sharpen the blade and
it’s the author’s hope that, by implementing the changes presented
in this Article, it can do just that.

* Captain Nandor Kiss is a Judge Advocate in the United States Army. He
is currently serving as a military prosecutor at Fort Bliss, Texas and previously served
as an Operations Officer and Legal Advisor for Essential Function 3 – Rule of Law,
part of NATO’s Resolute Support mission in Kabul, Afghanistan. Special thanks to
Colonel Andrew McKee for helping navigate Department of Defense pre-publication
review, and to Major Joey Comley, Lieutenant Colonel Michael Baileys, and my
wife, Captain Erin Kiss, for reviewing my drafts and providing their thoughts and
advice. The views presented are those of the author and do not necessarily represent
the views of the Department of Defense or its components.
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I. INTRODUCTION

In the hills of the Morazán region of el Salvador, near the
Honduran border sits the village of El Mozote. It is one of those
small corners of the world that typically eludes the attention of the
global community, and likely would have, had it not been for one
chilling ordeal in the early 1980s. At the time, the Morazán region
was home to a number of guerilla groups that had been consistently
evading the Salvadoran government during the country’s civil war.1
Eventually, one battalion of the Salvadoran armed forces found their
way to the village of El Mozote and over the course of three days
tortured, raped, and killed over 800 Civilians.2
On the morning of December 10, 1981, the Atlacatl
Battalion of the Salvadoran Army rounded up the civilian
inhabitants of the village in an attempt to obtain information on the
whereabouts of certain guerrilla leaders.3 During the day, the
victims were forcibly removed from their homes, gathered in the
village’s central plaza and made to lay in the dirt as Soldiers kicked
and beat them and stole their jewelry and other valuables.4 By
nightfall, the citizens of the village were told to return to their homes
and not leave or they would face immediate execution.5 The
following morning, the people were again pulled from their homes
and divided into groups of men, boys, girls, women, and children.6
The male inhabitants were led to the church to be either immediately
executed by decapitation or point-blank shots to the head; or, to be
tortured for information.7 At the same time, the girls and women
were marched up a hillside where they were raped, and then
summarily murdered.8 The children, recently orphaned, were
moved to an empty home where they too were systematically

1

See LEIGH BINFORD, THE EL MOZOTE MASSACRE 13–15 (1996)
(explaining how the People's Revolutionary Army (ERP) organized its base in the
Morzan region).
2
See id. at 18–22.
3
Id. at 18–19.
4
Id.
5
Id.
6
Id. at 20.
7
Id.
8
Id. at 21.
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executed; one after the other.9 The remaining structures were
vandalized, the homes burned, and the animals killed and burned
with the bodies of their former owners.10
The story of what would later be known as the El Mozote
massacre is a glimpse into the darkest side of humanity and while it is
a truly terrifying story, it is far from the sole example of this type of
barbarity being administered to innocent Civilians in remote reaches
of the globe. However, the reason why the El Mozote massacre
reached its heights of infamy was that the Atlacatl Battalion was
trained and equipped by the U.S.11
During the Cold War, the U.S.’ foreign policy began to focus
on developing partner nation’s capacity in order to allies in the fight
against the existential communist threat.12 One of earliest efforts to do
so was the School of the Americas (“SOA”), founded in 1946.13 The
purpose of the SOA was to train military forces in Central and
Southern American countries to develop them into strong allies
against communist forces.14 Early on, the SOA was viewed as wise
foreign policy and likely would have continued to had it not been for
the stories that started trickling in about U.S. trained Soldiers
committing human rights violations.15 One of the most egregious
incidents being the story at the beginning of this Article.16

9

Id. at 21-22.
Id. at 20–21.
11
See MARK DANNER, THE MASSACRE AT EL MOZOTE 3–10 (1994); see
also JAMES HODGE & LINDA COOPER, DISTURBING THE PEACE: THE STORY OF
FATHER ROY BOURGEOIS AND THE MOVEMENT TO CLOSE THE SCHOOL OF THE
AMERICAS 91 (2004) (describing the events that led to the creation of SOA
Watch); JACK NELSON–PALLMEYER, SCHOOL OF ASSASSINS: GUNS, GREED, AND
GLOBALIZATION 1–13, 21–32 (2001) (describing how the United States trained
and equipped the Atlacatl Battalion and the School of Americas).
12
See NELSON–PALLMEYER, supra note 11, at 14–15 (2001) (discussing
the policy to combat communism during the Cold War).
13
U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO 96-178, SCHOOL OF THE
AMERICAS: U.S. MILITARY TRAINING FOR LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES 1 (1996)
[hereinafter GAO 96-178]; HODGE & COOPER, supra note 11, at 91.
14
GAO 96-178, supra note 13, at 5–8; HODGE & COOPER, supra note 11,
at 91.
15
See HODGE & COOPER, supra note 11, at 91.
16
Ian Urbina, O.A.S. to Reopen Inquiry into Massacre in El Salvador in
1981,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Mar.
8,
2005),
10
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Upon the realization that these atrocities were occurring, and
that the Soldiers committing them had been trained by the U.S.,
increased scrutiny was applied to which nations and which units were
allowed to receive U.S. funding and support.17 The call to action was
answered by Senator Patrick Leahy of Vermont, through the passage
of what eventually became known as the eponymous “Leahy Laws,”18
which have now become the cornerstone of U.S. human rights policy.
The Leahy Law, also known as Leahy Amendment, was an
attempt to prevent U.S. funding or security assistance making its way
into the hands of known human rights violators19
It had, and
continues to have, a noble intent and should continue to be one of the
primary weapons brandished against human rights abuse in the world.
However, over the past three and a half decades a number of
substantive and practical deficiencies emerged that greatly diminish
the law’s ability to achieve the originally desired effect. These
deficiencies have also created a potential negative impact to U.S.
forces and interests as the U.S. has turned increasingly to allied forces
to perform tasks that were once the exclusive prevue of the U.S. armed
forces.
In order to correct these deficiencies, a number of small, yet
important, changes are necessary. This Article will identify some of
the well-documented problems in the law’s ability to achieve its
purpose and propose a number of adjustments to the law that may
better align its intent and effect. These recommendations range from
semantic edits to substantive policy changes which may affect the way
that Leahy operates in substantial ways. Importantly, these
adjustments are intended to work in isolation from one another; their
https://www.nytimes.com/2005/03/08/world/americas/oas-to-reopen-inquiryinto-massacre-in-el-salvador-in-1981.html.
17
See, e.g., About - School of the Americas Watch, SCH. OF THE
AMERICAS WATCH, https://www.soaw.org/about/ (last visited May 20, 2019)
(outlining the actions of SOA Watch, a non-profit group focused on monitoring
human rights abuses committed by graduates of the SOA).
18
Human Rights, U.S. SENATOR PATRICK LEAHY OF VT.,
https://www.leahy.senate.gov/issues/human-rights.
19
Daniel R. Mahanty, The “Leahy Law” Prohibiting US Assistance to
Human Rights Abusers: Pulling Back the Curtain, JUST SEC. (June 27, 2017),
https://www.justsecurity.org/42578/leahy-law-prohibiting-assistance-humanrights-abusers-pulling-curtain/.
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effectiveness should not depend on how many are ultimately
implemented. Each amendment would, independently, improve the
law’s ability to achieve its end.
This Article will proceed with a short background section,
discussing the how the Leahy Law functions, the history of how it
came to be, its precursors, major amendments, and expansion. Parts
III through VI will then focus on individual weaknesses in the law that
have been identified, and the existing conflicts that exist between the
intent and effect. These Sections will also propose recommended
adjustments or policy changes that are likely to correct, or at least
mitigate, the problems in Leahy’s functionality. This Article will then
make some conclusory remarks.
The Leahy Law is incredibly important to U.S. foreign policy,
especially in the area of human rights. Due in large part to its
importance, it must be continually improved and refined. Armed with
over thirty years of data and anecdotal evidence, this Article aims to
serve as a whetstone to sharpen the blade and ensure that America’s
cornerstone weapon against human rights abuse remains as capable as
it was originally intended to be.
II. BACKGROUND
A. How Leahy Works
1. The Law

The Leahy Law is a segment of law that has been injected in
the authorizations for both the Department of State and the
Department of Defense.20 Named after Vermont Senator Patrick
Leahy, the law is intended to prevent U.S. Foreign Assistance to units
of foreign security forces if there is “credible information” that the
unit, or any of its individual members, has committed a gross violation
of human rights.21 Once it has been discovered that a unit has violated
the Leahy law, it cannot receive any U.S. funding until it has taken
20

Leahy Law Fact Sheet, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, BUREAU OF
DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR, https://www.state.gov/key-topicsbureau-of-democracy-human-rights-and-labor/human-rights/leahy-law-factsheet/ (last updated Jan. 22, 2019).
21
Id.

7
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adequate measures to “remediate” the violation.22
While the Leahy law is typically referred to as if it were a
single statute, it is actually a pair of similar, though not identical,
provisions located in different authorizations.23
The Defense version of the law, located in the Howard P.
“Buck” McKeon National Defense Authorization Act, reads as
follows:
Of the amounts made available to the Department of Defense, none may
be used for any training, equipment, or other assistance for a unit of a
foreign security force if the Secretary of Defense has credible information
that the unit has committed a gross violation of human rights . . . This
prohibition shall not apply if the Secretary of Defense, after consultation
with the Secretary of State, determines that the government of such
country has taken all necessary corrective steps, or if the equipment or
other assistance is necessary to assist in disaster relief operations or other
humanitarian or national security emergencies . . . The Secretary of
Defense, after consultation with the Secretary of State, may waive the
prohibition…if the Secretary determines that the waiver is required by
extraordinary circumstances.24

The State Department version, located in Section
620M of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (“FAA”),
is as follows:
No assistance shall be furnished under this chapter or the Arms Export
Control Act [22 U.S.C. 2751 et seq.] to any unit of the security forces of a
foreign country if the Secretary of State has credible information that such
unit has committed a gross violation of human rights. The prohibition . . .
shall not apply if the Secretary determines and reports to the Committee on
Foreign Relations of the Senate, the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the
House of Representatives, and the Committees on Appropriations that the
government of such country is taking effective steps to bring the responsible
members of the security forces unit to justice . . . In the event that funds are
withheld from any unit pursuant to this section, the Secretary of State shall
promptly inform the foreign government of the basis for such action and
shall, to the maximum extent practicable, assist the foreign government in
taking effective measures to bring the responsible members of the security

22

Id.
Id.
24
10 U.S.C. § 362 (2016) (“[P]rohibition on use of funds for assistance
to units of foreign security forces that have committed a gross violation of human
rights”) (emphasis added).
23
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forces to justice.25

It is important to note that while the laws appear to be the same
on the first read, there are a number of key differences between the
two versions. The three primary variances are the difference in
remediation standards: “taking effective steps to bring the responsible
members to justice” as opposed to the Defense standard “all necessary
corrective steps have been taken.” The second is the Secretary of
Defense’s ability to waive the law’s prohibitions in “extraordinary
circumstances.” The third is the “duty to inform” provision requiring
the Secretary of State to promptly inform a foreign government of the
basis for withholding funding or support and the duty to assist the
foreign government to take effective steps towards remediation.26
These differences, and their impacts, will be discussed in greater
length in Part V of this Article.
a. Security Forces

The Department of State is silent on the specific definition of
“security forces,” but the Department of Defense defines it as both the
“duly constituted military, paramilitary, police, and constabulary
forces of a state,”27 as well as, “forces including but not limited to:
military forces; police forces; border police, coast guard, and customs
officials; paramilitary forces; forces peculiar to specific nations, state,
tribes, or ethnic groups; prison correctional and penal services;
infrastructure protection forces; and governmental ministries or
departments responsible for the above forces.”28

25

22 U.S.C § 2378d (1961) (“[L]imitation on assistance to security
forces”) (emphasis added).
26
NINA M. SERAFINO, ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV. R43361, “LEAHY
LAW” HUMAN RIGHTS PROVISIONS AND SECURITY ASSISTANCE: ISSUE OVERVIEW
1, 5 (2014).
27
U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., JOINT PUBLICATION, 1-02, DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE DICTIONARY OF MILITARY AND ASSOCIATED TERMS, i, 213 (2016).
28
U.S. ARMED FORCES, JOINT PUBLICATION 3-22 FOREIGN INTERNAL
DEFENSE,
i,
VI,
31
(2010),
https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3_22.pdf?ver=201810-10-112450-103.
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b. Gross Violations of Human Rights

Another important consideration is the determination of what,
specifically, constitutes a “gross violation of human rights”
(“GVHR”). These determinations are to be informed by existing
norms in international law. The Department of State version of the act
states that “the term ‘gross violations of internationally recognized
human rights’ includes torture or cruel, inhumane, or degrading
treatment or punishment, prolonged detention without charges and
trial, causing the disappearance of persons by the abduction and
clandestine detention of those persons, and other flagrant denial of
the right to life, liberty, or the security of person.”29 According to
the State Department, the definition also includes extrajudicial killings
as well as any politically motivated rape.30
c. Units

The Leahy law specifies that in the event an allegation is
substantiated, it is only the specific “unit” rather than the entirety of
the armed forces that is subject to Leahy sanctions. According to
Congress, the term “unit” is intended to be “construed as the smallest
operational group in the field that has been implicated in the reported
violation.”31 In practice, this means that if there is information that
someone within a unit has committed a gross violation of human
rights, the entire unit is barred unless it can be established that the
incident was the responsibility of a smaller, subordinate unit. As a
result, the more detailed the information about the alleged incident, the
smaller the effect of Leahy sanctions.
2. Remediation

The Leahy law features a few exceptions, the most important
of which is for remediation. Under this exception, the Departments of
State or Defense may continue to provide security assistance after
29

Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 § 502B(d)(1) Pub. L. No. 87-195
(codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. 2340(d)(I)).
30
SERAFINO, ET AL., supra note 26, at 2.
31
SENATE
REPORTS
58
(2003),
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-108shrg92146/html/CHRG108shrg92146.htm.
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determining that sufficient remedial steps have been taken to address
the human rights violation.32 In order to use this exception, the
Department of Defense version requires the Secretary of Defense,
after consultation with the Secretary of State, determine that the
government of such country has taken all necessary corrective steps.33
The Department of State version merely requires that the Secretary of
State determine that the government of the violating country is taking
effective steps to bring the responsible members of the security forces
unit to justice.34 Congress has not expressly defined either of these
standards, nor has there been any express rationale provided justifying
the need for two separate standards.
In 2015, the Departments of State and Defense adopted a joint
policy on remediation which established a three-step process to
declare a unit remediated.35 The policy lays out three primary
components of the remediation process: (1) investigation; (2) as
appropriate, judicial or administrative adjudication; and (3) as
appropriate, sentencing or comparable administrative actions.36 Once
a senior U.S. official in a country or embassy is satisfied that these
steps have been taken, the information will be forwarded to a review
panel at the Secretarial level to decide whether the unit has been
remediated.37 Once remediation has been declared, the unit may once
32

Memorandum from Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel, “Additional
Guidance on Implementation of Section 8057(b), DoD Appropriations Act, 2014
(Division C of Public Law 113-76) (“the DoD Leahy law”) and New or
Fundamentally Different Units” 9 (Feb. 10, 2015) [hereinafter Secretary of
Defense Memorandum].
33
10 U.S.C. § 362 (emphasis added).
34
22 U.S.C. § 2378d (2014) (emphasis added).
35
U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., DODIG-2018-018, IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
DOD LEAHY LAW REGARDING ALLEGATIONS OF CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE BY
MEMBERS OF THE AFGHAN NATIONAL DEFENSE AND SECURITY FORCES 10–11
(Nov. 16, 2017), https://media.defense.gov/2017/Nov/17/2001845582/-1/1/1/DODIG-2018-018.PDF [hereinafter DODIG-2018-018]. This memo also
states that, as a matter of policy, the remediation standards will be treated the
same. Id. This is explained in further detail in Part V, infra.
36
Id. at 10.
37
Id. at 10–11. The process is slightly more complex than explained here.
The review panel, called the Remediation Review Panel (RRP) is made up of
several DoD and DoS stakeholders who decide whether the standard has been
met. Id. at 10-11. If they are unable to agree, the issue is elevated to a Senior
Remediation Review Panel (SRRP), then to the Assistant Secretary level, and
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again begin receiving U.S. security assistance.38
3. Additional DoD Exceptions

In addition to the remediation exception which appears in
both the State and Defense version of the Leahy law, there are two
additional exceptions within the DoD version of the law and other
exceptions that exist outside the statutes themselves. The first
express DoD exception, added in 2014 as part of the Consolidated
Appropriations Act,39 is for equipment or other assistance necessary
to assist in disaster relief operations or other humanitarian or
national security emergencies.40 The other exception is a waiver
that allows the Secretary of Defense, after consulting with the
Secretary of State, to waive the prohibitions against funding
training, assistance, or other equipment if the Secretary of Defense
determines that such a waiver is required by “extraordinary
circumstances.”41 Although this may seem like an easy way to avoid
the Leahy law’s prohibitions, it has never been used.42 This is
partially due to the fact that Congress has never defined
“extraordinary circumstances” for the purposes of this law.43
Other than the exceptions written into the Leahy laws
themselves, some other statutes and appropriations contain built-in
exceptions to Leahy.44 The most well-known example of this is the
Afghan Security Forces Fund (“ASFF”).45 The relevant provision
ultimately to the Secretaries themselves. For those interested, the specifics of this
process are explained in the joint policy memorandum. See id
38
Secretary of Defense Memorandum, supra note 32, at 9.
39
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-76, § 621,
128 Stat. 5, 228.
40
10 U.S.C. § 362 (2016).
41
Id.
42
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO 13-866, HUMAN RIGHTS:
ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE, MONITORING, AND TRAINING COULD IMPROVE
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE LEAHY LAWS 7 (2013) hereinafter GAO 13-866].
43
DODIG-2018-018, supra note 35, at 9 n.30.
44
See, e.g., § 8057, 128 Stat. 5.
45
See, e.g., James LaPorta, Report: Pentagon skirted U.S. law on human
rights abuses in Afghanistan, UPI (Jan. 23, 2018, 4:59 PM),
https://www.upi.com/Defense-News/2018/01/23/Report-Pentagon-skirted-USlaw-on-human-rights-abuses-in-Afghanistan/9321516732458/; OFFICE OF THE
SEC’Y OF DEF., JUSTIFICATION FOR FY 2020 OVERSEAS CONTINGENCY
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within the ASFF is known as the “notwithstanding” authority. It
reads:
That such funds shall be available to the Secretary of Defense,
notwithstanding any other provision of law, for the purpose of allowing
the Commander, Combined Security Transition Command—Afghanistan,
or the Secretary’s designee, to provide assistance, with the concurrence of
the Secretary of State, to the security forces of Afghanistan, including the
provision of equipment, supplies, services, training, facility and
infrastructure repair, renovation, and construction, and funding.46

Upon first read, it doesn’t appear to mean much but it
provides the commander of Combined Security Transition
Command—Afghanistan (“CSTC-A”)47 with the authority to waive
the provisions of any other provision of law, including Leahy, if she
determines it necessary. Despite the seemingly broad application,
there are no records available showing that this provision has
received more than “limited exercise.”48
4. Sanctions

The end result of a substantiated allegation that a unit or
individual committed a gross violation of human rights is that the
security forces unit will no longer be eligible for U.S. assistance,
training, or equipment. In practice, this ineligibility is referred to as
OPERATIONS AFGHANISTAN SECURITY FORCES FUND (2019); SPECIAL INSPECTOR
GEN. FOR AFG. RECONSTRUCTION, SIGAR 17-47-IP CHILD SEXUAL ASSAULT IN
AFGHANISTAN: IMPLEMENTATION OF LEAHY LAWS AND REPORTS OF ASSAULT BY
AFGHAN
SECURITY
FORCES
(Jan.
18,
2018),
https://www.sigar.mil/pdf/inspections/SIGAR%2017-47-IP.pdf
[hereinafter
SIGAR 17-47-IP].
46
§ 8057, 128 Stat. 5 (emphasis added).
47
From their website, “CSTC-A trains, advises, and assists within
Afghan security institutions to develop resource management capability,
Inspector General and rule of law capability, and provides resources in accordance
with the Afghan National Defense Security Forces requirements while ensuring
fiscal oversight and accountability of funds and materiel delivered. CSTC-A is
focused on helping Afghanistan develop a sustainable, effective and affordable
ANDSF in support of the Afghan Government.” Resolute Support Afghanistan,
N. ATLANTIC TREATY ORG., http://www.rs.nato.int/rs-commands/combinedsecurity-transition-command-afghanistan.aspx.
48
DODIG-2018-018, supra note 35, at 14.
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being “Leahy-barred” or receiving “Leahy-sanctions.” These
sanctions remain in place unless an exception is used or the unit is
able to remediate itself.49
5. Leahy Vetting

The final piece of the Leahy Law involves a process which
has come to be known as “Leahy Vetting.” After a unit has been
Leahy barred, it is entered into a Department of State database
known as “International Vetting and Security Tracking” or
INVEST.50 Then, whenever an organization is planning to request
support or training for a foreign unit, they will submit a list of the
individuals set to receive training to be “vetted.”51 The vetting
process involves a background check, records search, and
certification before any unit or individual is allowed to receive U.S.
support. 52 If the unit or individuals are cleared, they may receive
training, if not, they will be turned away and the training or other
assistance will be prohibited, ending the Leahy process.
B. The History of Leahy
1. Precursors to Leahy

The legislative history that ended in the passing of the
modern Leahy amendments began in the 1970s. Congress wanted
to apply increased pressure to respect human rights on countries that
were receiving U.S. security assistance.53 At first, these laws were
small attachments to legislation that addressed specific countries
and emplaced specific conditions on the receipt of support.54 These
developed into a more expansive version of the requirement known
as “Section 502B” which was a reference to Section 502B of the
49

Secretary of Defense Memorandum, supra note 32, at 9.
SERAFINO ET AL., supra note 24, at 10.
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FAA. Section 502B prohibited any funding from being provided to
a country found to be engaging in a “consistent pattern of gross
violations of internationally recognized human rights.”55 However,
this proto-Leahy suffered from its breadth; according the
Congressional Research Service, the Department of State never
invoked Section 502B to refuse funding because it was “overly
broad.”56
The next generation of Leahy was a series of counternarcotic statutes that aimed to encourage human rights compliance
in nations that were receiving U.S. support in combating the drug
trade.57 These laws prevented FY 1998 funds from being provided
to foreign security forces when there was credible evidence of gross
violations of human rights.58
2. Early Leahy Law

The set of laws that we now know as the Leahy Amendments
can trace their roots back to the counter-narcotics statutes of the late
’90s. In 1998, Congress decided to expand the application of the
counter-narcotics version of Leahy to all assistance provided to
foreign nations through Department of State appropriations each
year.59 Finally, this practice was permanently codified in the FAA,60
applying to all assistance authorized by the FAA and Arms Export
and Control Act (AECA) unless exempted through a
notwithstanding provision.61
Congress also decided to apply the Leahy provision to the
Department of Defense appropriations as well.62 This originally
prohibited DOD funds to train units of a foreign military or other
security forces if there was credible information that a member of a
55

22 U.S.C § 2304(a)(2) (2014).
SERAFINO, ET AL., supra note 12, at 3.
57
Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 104208, 110 Stat. 3009-138.
58
Act of Nov. 6, 2000, Pub. L. No. 429, 114 Stat. 1900.
59
Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs
Appropriations Act, 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-118, 585, 111 Stat. 2386 (1997).
60
22 U.S.C. 2378d. (1996).
61
See infra Section II.A.3.
62
Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 1999, Pub L. No. 105262, § 8115, 112 Stat. 2279, 2327 (1998).
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unit had committed a gross violation of human rights.63 This
original version differed from the FAA in that it only applied to
training, not to other forms of assistance as was prohibited in the
Department of State version of the law.64 From that point on, both
Department of Defense and State appropriations were permanently
subject to Leahy vetting.
3. Leahy Amendment and Expansion

Over the past 20 years, there have been a number of changes
to the Leahy Law’s provisions which range in effect. Early changes
to the DoD version removed language about “members” of units to
clarify that the law was intended to be applied to the entirety of a
tainted unit.65 In 2013, the words “or police” were added.66
In 2011, Congress took steps to better align the DoD and
DoS versions of the law by clarifying that the requirement applied
when there was “a gross violation” as opposed to “gross
violations.”67 Secondly, the standard to resume aid in the FAA
version was adjusted to “effective steps” instead of “effective
measures” to better match the DoD “all necessary steps” standard.68
Lastly, the standard of proof was changed from “credible evidence”
to “credible information.”69
One of the largest changes to the Defense version took place
in 2014 when Congress removed one of the major differences with
the State version and increased application to “any training,
equipment, or other assistance” for the members of the foreign
63

Id. § 8130.
Compare id., 112 Stat. 2279, at 2235 (“any training program”) with
“none of the funds made available by this act” § 563, 114 Stat. 1900, at 1900A-8.
65
Department of Defense Appropriations Act of 2000, Pub L. No. 106–
79, § 8014, 113 Stat. 1212 (1999).
66
Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2013, 127
Stat. 198, 199 (Division C).
67
Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-74, 125 Stat. 787, 118182 (2011).
68
Id.
69
This change was made to clarify that the information used to
substantiate a Leahy violation would not necessarily be admissible evidence in a
court of law. This will be discussed further in Section III of this Article.
64
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unit.70 This greatly increased the application of the Leahy Law
within the DoD and resulted in additional guidance being distributed
throughout the Armed Forces detailing which authorities were
affected.71 The 2014 amendment also created new exceptions for
disaster or humanitarian assistance.72
C. Summation

Armed with an understanding of the law as it currently
functions, and the history and intent behind its development, this
Article will now turn to an analysis of the law and some of its
deficiencies and propose changes that can be made to better align
the law’s effect with its intent.
III. ISSUE 1: CREDIBLY INFORMED—CLARIFYING THE STANDARD
OF PROOF IN LEAHY CASES

As a Leahy practitioner working in a U.S. embassy or
military headquarters, you are tasked with deciding whether a recent
allegation of a gross violation of human rights is sufficient to Leahybar the security force unit that supposedly committed it. The atissue unit is critically important to both U.S. and the host-nation’s
defense strategy and relies heavily on U.S. security assistance,
funding, and support. The allegation, made by a well-respected nongovernmental organization (“NGO”), consists of the vague
statements of a handful of undisclosed sources. You now have to
decide; does this meet the Leahy standard? Should the U.S. cease
all support? The implications of this decision are huge, but as you
look at your existing guidance and Standard Operating Procedures
(SOPs), you find yourself in an incredibly difficult position; how do
you make the call?
Currently, the standard of proof necessary to substantiate a
Leahy violation is “credible information” that a gross violation of
human rights occurred. However, this wasn’t always the case. The
current standard was created in 2011. Before that, Leahy laws used
70

§ 8057, 128 Stat. 5, at 118–19.
See Memorandum from Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel,
“Implementation of Section 8057(b), DoD Appropriations Act, 2014 (Division C
of Public Law 113-76) (“the DoD Leahy law”)” Tab B, 5 (Aug. 14, 2014).
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Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2014, supra note 39.
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the standard created in the early counter-narcotic days which
required “credible evidence” instead. The change from “evidence”
to “information” was made to address confusion in the practitioner
community. Practitioners were reading the term “evidence” and
assuming that it invoked the types of evidentiary protections
afforded in a court proceeding. This was never the intent of Leahy’s
drafters. In a 1999 conference report for the Omnibus Consolidated
Emergency Supplemental, the conferees clarified that “by ‘credible
evidence’ [we] do not intend that the evidence must be admissible
in a court of law.”73 The term “evidence” was never intended to be
used in the same sense as the Federal Rules of Evidence, but that
intent was lost on many practitioners.
Practitioners continued to assume evidentiary considerations
existed in the law. Perhaps due to the appearance of evidence law
in Leahy determinations, Congress acted to cure the confusion. In
2012 the term “evidence” was removed and replaced with the
modern standard: “credible information.” The rationale for this
change was explicitly stated in the conference report for the
Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2012: “[The Act] substituted
‘credible information’ for ‘credible evidence’ in order to clarify that
the information need not be admissible in a court of law to be
credible and to conform to similar wording in a comparable
provision74 in the Defense Appropriations Act.”75
A. What is the Standard?

With the 2012 amendment, the problem of deciphering
“evidence” was solved. It is likely that those drafting the amendment
believed there would no longer be any problem in deciphering the
standard of proof in Leahy cases. “Credible information,” the new
standard, would make it easier for practitioners to make more uniform,
predictable determinations. Yet despite Congress’s good intentions,
73

Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations
Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681 (1998); H.R. REP. NO. 105-825,
at 1168 (1999).
74
Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 1999, Pub. L. No. 105262, 112 Stat. 2279 (1998). The Department of Defense version has had the
“credible information” standard since its inception in 1999.
75
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-74, 125 Stat.
786 (2012); H.R. Rᴇᴘ. Nᴏ. 112-331, at 1355 (2012).
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there remained a glaring issue, no one has any idea what “credible
information” actually means.
In a 2017 RAND Corporation study, a number of interviews
were conducted with DoD and DoS Leahy practitioners to acquire a
more precise picture of how Leahy functions in the field.76 One of the
concerns documented in the report was that many of the interviewees
were unsure how to determine the meaning of “credible
information.”77 There is no official Department of Defense definition
for the term in law or in any supplemental guidance that has been
released.78 The DoS has recently released guidance which includes a
definition of the term,79 but practitioners continually express
confusion and the DoD has expressly stated that it will not use the
same definition provided by DoS.80 The RAND study found that out
of 16 DoS Leahy vetting Standard Operating Procedures (“SOPs”)
they collected, only one included a definition.81 One interviewee
requested clarification from the Department of State headquarters, and
was told it was up to the post to decide the meaning.82 Interviewees
reported significant differences between their interpretation of the
standard, and the interpretation used at the DoS headquarters.83
The Department of Defense Inspector General (“DODIG”),
found the same thing; there is no formal standard. In a November
2017 report,84 DODIG interviewed one official, who stated, “the
credibility of information is determined on a case-by-case basis and
76

See generally MICHAEL J. MCNERNEY, ET AL., IMPROVING
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE LEAHY LAW (2017)
[hereinafter RAND] (discussing the vetting processes and methodology for Leahy
practitioners).
77
Id. at 39.
78
DODIG-2018-018, supra note 35, at 53.
79
Id. at 54. The DoS interprets “credible information” to mean
“information that is sufficiently believable that a reasonable person would rely on
such information in their decision-making process. The application of the standard
does not require a fact finder actually to conclude that a security force has
committed a GVHR. The term ‘credible information’. . . is a low evidentiary
standard.” Id. at 53–54 (quoting the DOS “2017 Leahy Vetting Guide; A Guide
to Implementation and Best Practices”).
80
Id.
81
RAND, supra note 76, at 39.
82
Id.
83
Id.
84
DODIG-2018-018, supra note 35, at 55.
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the knowledge of doing so is gained through doing the job and having
experience.” Another official called the standard “very subjective.”
According to the DODIG report, the Office of the Under Secretary of
Defense for Policy (“OUSD(P)”), the office responsible for managing
the DoD’s Leahy portfolio, was “unable to articulate the methodology
used…to determine whether the information was credible. They
simply stated that [representatives] always reach a consensus and that
it was a judgement call decided on a case-by-case basis.”85 DODIG
concluded that “there is no record of the reasoning behind any credible
information determinations, and there is no specific guidance or
criteria for making these decisions… As a result, there is a risk of
inconsistency, and the OUSD(P)’s process could be deficient in
identifying credible information to comply with DoD Leahy Law.”86
In addition to issues defining the standard, there is also great
concern with the reliability of the information that is actually used.87
The reliability of source information was an issue that came up
multiple times in the RAND study.88 One DoS official noted that the
evidentiary threshold for credible information was relatively low but
that information from questionable sources was weighed and valued
differently at different stages of the vetting process.89 One interviewee
described a “hierarchy of information sources” wherein he weighed
“official reporting as ‘reliable,’ other media as ‘mixed,’ and social
media as ‘very fuzzy90.’”91 The RAND study concluded the discussion
on the topic by stating: “[s]takeholders perceived final determinations
on information credibility to be opaque and inconsistent. This was
frustrating not only for DoD officials implementing assistance
programs but also for partners themselves. As one [Combatant
Command] official noted: “Failure to apply appropriate rigor to
adjudication prior to the suspension of assistance may negatively
impact bilateral relationships and partner nation willingness to

85

Id.
Id. at 56.
87
RAND, supra note 76, at 40.
88
See generally RAND supra note 77.
89
Id. at 40.
90
“Very fuzzy” is an academically nebulous standard that caused the
author much grief during his tenure in law school.
91
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investigate and address legitimate allegations.”92
Clearly, the standard used in Leahy cases, “credible
information,” is vague, often misunderstood, and subject to disparate
treatment. This is an obvious impediment to practitioner confidence
and uniform application of a standard across the Federal Government,
but the problem extends even further.
B. Effects of Poor Interpretation

As detailed above, there are abundant difficulties in assessing
what information should be relied upon in making credibility
determinations, and how to properly weigh them. Without clarity,
there is a high probability that determinations can be overly narrow or
overly broad and ultimately affect units that have done nothing wrong.
The study conducted by the RAND Corporation uncovered a number
of cautionary tales that clearly illustrate this concern.93 In one
situation, a well-known human rights advocacy organization made
allegations that a partner nation security force had committed gross
violations of human rights.94 The local Leahy-vetting officials at the
embassy were able to work extensively with the partner nation and
other NGOs in the area to provide enough background information to
refute the allegations; but without extensive efforts by the embassy
staff, that unit could have been barred from U.S. assistance based on
false information.95 It is easy to see how this can be a problem for
U.S. bilateral relations; just one false report from an NGO and the U.S.
completely shuts down security assistance. Guilty until proven
innocent.
It can also be difficult to explain the Leahy process to partner
nations. “Too often, partners see Leahy merely as a bureaucratic
impediment and have little understanding of their role in creating a
smooth process.”96 This is exasperated by the relatively amorphous
nature of the “credible information” standard. To many partner
nations, this can simply look like a convoluted way of disguising
capricious intent on the part of the United States. A disgruntled partner
92

Id. at 40.
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nation may believe: “The U.S. doesn’t want to support us so they came
up with this nonsense to justify their actions.”
C. Difficulties of Interpretation

The previous section detailed an example of false information
being relied upon in Leahy vetting. This is a problem that has been
documented in multiple countries and with multiple partner nations.97
It is not, however, the only example of over-breath in application.
There have also been allegations that some of the “derogatory
information” relied upon in Leahy-vetting credibility determinations
had nothing to do with human rights abuses. The RAND Corporation
study found incidents of units being Leahy-barred due to an individual
having a driving under the influence charge.98 These are all indicative
of a larger issue, the “credible information” standard is hard to apply
to real cases.
One example of this difficulty was experienced by the author
during a recent deployment to Afghanistan. In April of 2017, The
United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (“UNAMA”)
released a report on the treatment of conflict-related detainees.99 The
report consists of interviews conducted with 469 conflict-related
detainees in 62 detention facilities in 29 provinces across
Afghanistan.100 It concluded that 39 percent of detainees gave
“credible and reliable accounts of having experienced torture or other
forms of inhuman or degrading treatment whilst in the custody of [the
Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF)].”101 Clearly,
this is unacceptable, and if true, it constitutes the precise type of human
rights abuses that Leahy aims to address. This would have been a
perfect time to invoke Leahy if not for a single serious problem, the
report didn’t provide any information about the actual incidents. In
97

Id. at 40–41.
Id. at 41.
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See generally U.N., Office of the United Nations High Comm’r for
Human Rights (OHCHR), Treatment of Conflict-Related Detainees:
Implementation of Afghanistan’s National Plan on the Elimination of Torture
(2017), https://unama.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/treatment_of_conflictrelated_detainees_24_april_2017.pdf [hereinafter UNAMA] (discussing the
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reading the report, there are broad references to a number of torturerelated incidents taking place by organizations in certain areas,102 but
the particulars of specific cases were never released.
This creates a frustrating Leahy-vetting issue: Did these
reports constitute “credible information” of gross violations of human
rights committed by the units in these areas? Potentially. There was
enough information to identify the area and organization that was
responsible, but there was no information about the specific incidents
of torture. In trusting the highly-respected United Nations agency, the
U.S. could make a credibility determination on the word of the
UNAMA report alone, but there would still be an overbreadth
problem. If only one police station, military unit, or other organization
was at fault, it would be unnecessarily damaging to the Afghan
National Security and U.S.-Afghan relations to Leahy-bar entire
swaths of units based on the report. And there remained the issue of
whether these incidents, if examined individually by U.S. personnel,
would meet the Leahy standard. It is no wonder then, that the DoD
and DoS came to opposite conclusions in this case. The DoS chose to
believe UNAMA and find the allegations credible while the DoD
stated that “in order to consider that information credible, it would
need a corroborating source or additional evidence from UNAMA,
beyond the statement in its report.”103
This issue is compounded when incidents receive national
attention. In July 2017, an article was released in The Washington
Post entitled, “Afghan soldiers are using boys as sex slaves, and the
U.S. is looking the other way.”104 The article details the author’s
experience with an unnamed Afghan police commander showing off
his prized Bacha Bazi boy. Bacha Bazi is a terrible practice that exists
in some parts of Afghanistan involving wealthy men “acquiring”
102

Id. at 37. For example, the report details that of the 22 reports of
torture at the hands of the Afghan Local Police, seven victims reported being
beaten on arrest by ALP in Nangarhar province, five by ALP in Baghlan, two by
ALP in Kunduz, and one each by ALP in Badakhshan, Balkh, Faryab, Kunar,
Laghman, Paktika, Paktiya, Sar-e-Pul and Takhar.
103
DODIG-2018-018, supra note 35, at 55.
104
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https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/global-opinions/wp/2017/07/18/afghansoldiers-are-using-boys-as-sex-slaves-and-the-u-s-is-looking-the-otherway/?utm_term=.b92c8179e507.

23

522

PACE INT’L L. REV.

[Vol. 31:2

dancing slave boys and forcing them to dance for their guests, and
occasionally perform sexual favors.105 The practice has been
condemned by the United Nations106 and is also clearly the type of
behavior that should invoke Leahy. The Washington Post article
criticizes the U.S. for not doing enough to stop the practice and even
invokes the Leahy Law by name: “turning a blind eye to crimes such
as Bacha Bazi amounts to a serious contravention of America’s Leahy
amendment, which bans U.S. assistance or training to foreign military
units that fail to honor basic human rights.”107 The article, which
garnered hundreds of comments and thousands of shares on social
media, presented difficulties for Leahy practitioners: despite the
overwhelming pressure to respond to the incident detailed in the
article, how do you address it without more specific information?
And, if you don’t invoke Leahy, what ground can you stand on when
responding to the public outcry?
Without a clearly defined standard of proof, or review, it is
difficult to provide a clear answer about the “correct” actions in any of
these cases. The U.S. risks damaging relationships and tainting
innocent units if it applies the standard too broadly, and risks failing
the “front page test” in the Washington Post for not applying the
standard strictly enough. Further, in either instance, there is not a lot
of legal ground to stand on in justifying the position. The practitioners
cannot point to the “credible information” standard for explanation
because the standard is poorly understood and too inconsistently
applied. The solution, then, is to change the standard to something
that can more easily be understood and applied by practitioners, and
better explain decisions to the press, partner nations, and the American
public. Which brings us to the first suggested change presented by this
Article: change “credible information” to “probable cause.”
D. Probable Cause

“Of the amounts made available to the Department of
Defense, none may be used for any training, equipment, or
105

Id.
See, e.g., U.N. Secretary General, Report of the Secretary-General on
Conflict-Related Sexual Violence, U.N. Doc. S/2019/280 (Apr. 15, 2017),
https://undocs.org/en/S/2019/280.
107
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other assistance for a unit of a foreign security force if the
Secretary of Defense has probable cause to believe that the
unit has committed a gross violation of human rights.”
The solution proposed by this Article is to change the
standard of proof in Leahy to mirror an established legal standard
from elsewhere in American jurisprudence. There are two primary
benefits to this approach. First, you provide the practitioner
community, partner nations, and the American public, with a
familiar requirement that has been analyzed and scrutinized in
countless cases over the course of the last 200 years. Second, you
provide practitioners with the entirety of American jurisprudence to
assist them when difficult cases emerge.
The justification provided above could support the use of
any established legal standard from “reasonable suspicion” through
“beyond a reasonable doubt.” The decision about which standard to
choose is subject to debate, and ultimately comes down to a policy
decision to be made by Congress. However, given what we know
about the original intent of Leahy, this Article believes that
“probable cause” would be best. Upon first glance, it appears to be
the closest in effect to “credible information,” and it is a standard
that should be very familiar to legal experts and laymen alike. For
the sake of ease and demonstration, the following analysis will
assume probable cause is selected as the new standard and then
better explain why, although others may be viable, it is the proper
choice.
1. In Favor of an Established Standard

As stated above, there are two primary reasons to support a
change from “credible information” to a more established standard
of proof in Leahy cases. The first is the familiarity of the standard,
and the second is the ease of application. Turning back to the study
conducted by the RAND Corporation, practitioners repeatedly
expressed their concerns with the actual degree of scrutiny being
applied, the degree of credibility and hierarchy to assign information
sources, and the amount of information necessary to substantiate an
allegation.108 These issues all disappear when the law is changed
108

See generally RAND, supra note 76 (explaining how the United
States can better identify and punish human rights violators).
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from “credible information” to “probable cause.” Probable cause
has been defined in a number of different ways, but for the sake of
this Article, we will use the definition set forth by the Supreme Court
(with a few adjustments to better suit our subject matter): “where the
facts and circumstances within the [deciding official’s] knowledge,
and of which they have reasonably trustworthy information, are
sufficient in themselves to warrant a belief by a person of reasonable
caution that a [gross violation of human rights] has been
committed.”109
Familiarity, the first benefit, is something that can be
realized immediately and simply by the implementation of the
change. Knowing that there is established standard will likely
increase a practitioner’s faith that the Leahy standard is being
enforced uniformly. This in turn will allow them to focus on a fair
application, rather than feeling tempted to warp the standard to fit
what they believe to be a proper outcome as determined by political
or public demand.
This standard would also sound better when explained to the
American public or partner nations. Without a well-established
standard of proof, it may appear to some that there is no standard at
all. “Credible information” as officially defined by Leahy vetting
SOPs can very easily be confused with “credible information” in the
common sense: information that someone, somewhere, found
credible, for some reason. In contrast, announcing that “there was
insufficient information to establish probable cause that a unit
engaged in violations of human rights” carries with it a weight that
the public has ascribed to the well-known standard of probable
cause.110
Far more importantly than appearances and familiarity, it
will actually work better. This brings us to the second reason to
support a change to an established legal standard: ease of
application. Over the course of American history, there have been
hundreds of court cases that have interpreted the probable cause
standard as it applies to different situations. Practitioners, armed
with this expansive jurisprudence, will be far better equipped to

109
110
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make credibility determinations. In order to demonstrate how this
could work, we will first need to indulge a brief history lesson.
In the preeminent cases of United States v. Spinelli111 and
Aguilar v. Texas,112 the U.S. Supreme Court was tasked with
determining whether there was probable cause when warrants were
heavily based on the statements of confidential informants.113 In
Aguilar they held that there was no probable cause to search when
the only information supporting a warrant was an affidavit of police
officers who swore that they had “received reliable information
form a credible person and do believe” that narcotics were
present.114 The court held that there was insufficient information to
allow the magistrate who issued the warrant to determine the
credibility of the informants statements and that “the magistrate
must be informed of some of the underlying circumstances relied on
by the person providing the information and some of the underlying
circumstances from which the affiant concluded that the informant,
whose identity was not disclosed, was credible or his information
reliable.”115 The Court in Spinelli further clarified that the
magistrate must be informed of the “underlying circumstances from
which the informant had concluded” that a crime was committed.116
The result of these cases came to be known as the Aguilar-Spinelli
test, that probable cause cannot be established on the basis of a
confidential informant without facts showing that (1) the informant
is reliable and credible and (2) establishing some of the underlying
circumstances relied upon by the person providing the
information.117
The two-prong test was later overruled in favor of a totalityof-the circumstances approach in Illinois v. Gates,118 but the
“veracity” and “basis of knowledge” factors are still considered to
111
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See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 214 (1983) (explaining the
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be relevant considerations in the determination of probable cause,119
and some states still use the test for probable cause determinations
under their own constitutions.120
Now, given the quick guidance from these cases and our new
definition, one can make a determination in the Leahy context.
Focus on the UNAMA report from earlier that contained allegations
that members of the Afghan Local Police had been torturing
detainees. Under the totality of the circumstances, are the facts and
circumstances, as known to the deciding official, sufficient in
themselves to warrant a belief by a person of reasonable caution that
a gross violation of human rights has been committed?121
On first thought, one may believe that there is obviously
enough to meet the standard. After all, UNAMA, an agent of the
United Nations, said that it happened. However, upon further
reflection a practitioner may ask: where did they get their
information? In this case, the source of the information was from
undisclosed combat-related detainees;122 which could just as easily
be called confidential criminal informants. The Leahy practitioner
should not be attempting to determine UNAMA’s credibility any
more than a court would focus on the credibility of a police affiant.
Instead, the practitioner should focus on the credibility of the
informants UNAMA interviewed. So, what is known about them?
If one were to apply what he’s learned of Aguilar and
Spinelli, he may ask: what can be said about the veracity of the
source? In this case, nothing. There is no information available
about the individual answering UNAMA’s questions, their
reliability, or their credibility. UNAMA says they are credible, but
that is no different than the police officers in Aguilar and their
warrant based on “reliable information from a credible person.”123
What about the second prong, the basis of knowledge for the
information? The practitioner knows that the detainees are
experiencing what they perceive to be torture, but nothing of the
119
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underlying circumstances, what has been done to them, who is doing
it, or in what fashion it was done. This is almost identical to the
situation in Aguilar, wherein the magistrate had no information
about the basis for the informant’s knowledge. As such, a Leahy
practitioner can come to the conclusion that these incidents do not
establish probable cause.
In doing so, he can demonstrate his reasoning based on
established case law, and provide others a basis for challenging his
decision with further legal analysis. The rationale for his
determination can be held out to the public, to Congress, and to the
partner nation, and demonstrate consistency in application of the
law.
2. In Favor of Probable Cause

Neither of the two reasons to move away from “credible
information” would be affected if the standard of proof applied was
“clear and convincing evidence,” “reasonable suspicion,” or any
other established standard of proof. The analysis and the case law
would change, the definitions would change, but the rationale would
remain. You’d still provide practitioners, the public, and partnernations with a more easily understandable, and more familiar
standard, and you’d still arm decision makers with a well-developed
jurisprudence to inform their decisions. Yet despite the fact that
other standards may work, it is the opinion of this Article that
probable cause works best, and most closely resembles the intent of
Leahy’s existing “credible information” standard.
One thing that has been made clear is that the original intent
for the Leahy standard of proof was that the information it was based
on did not have to be admissible in court;124 that it did not need to
be admissible “evidence.” Probable cause meets this criterion.
Information does not need to meet the requirements of admissibility
in a court in order to be used in a probable cause determination. As
discussed above, information from confidential informants, which
would be barred from admission in court due to the Sixth
Amendment right to confrontation,125 is permissible when

124
125

See generally H.R. REP. NO. 112-331 (2011) (Conf. Rep.).
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determining probable cause.126 The same is true with hearsay
evidence, which can be used as the basis probable cause when
obtaining a warrant.127 The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
expressly state that at preliminary hearings, in which magistrates
determine probable cause, the defendant is not allowed to “object to
evidence on the ground that it was unlawfully acquired.”128
Privileged evidence is also often relied upon in Probable Cause
hearings as evidenced by a number of cases where probable cause
was determined by the statements of a spouse, seemingly in
violation of spousal privileges.129 The law in this area is best
summed up by Justice Black in addressing whether the of rules of
evidence should apply in Grand Jury proceedings: “It would run
counter to the whole history of the grand jury institution, in which
laymen conduct their inquiries unfettered by technical rules. Neither
justice nor the concept of a fair trial requires such a change.”130
Probable cause meets Leahy’s intent and quashes the fear that the
U.S. would continue to fund human rights abusers due to the tyranny
of such “technical rules.” As such, it is the ideal choice.131
E. Summation

The current standard of proof in Leahy vetting is confusing,
poorly applied, and subject to an inappropriate degree of subjective
126
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interpretation. This causes great difficulties for the practitioner
community, and risks U.S. relations with partner nations. In order
to improve application of the Leahy laws, and to further its intent,
the standard should be changed from “credible information” to
“probable cause.” Changing to an existing and recognized legal
standard provides Leahy practitioners with the benefit of American
jurisprudence, and the guidance that it offers, and it lends more
legitimacy to the Leahy-vetting process. Once the decision to
switch to an established standard is made, probable cause is the best
choice. It meets the intent of Leahy’s drafters and as such, would
likely strike the desirable balance between reliability of information
and protection against over-application of Leahy sanctions.
IV. ISSUE 2: CLASSIFIED INFORMATION AND THE DUAL PURPOSES
OF LEAHY

During a classified briefing, you learn that U.S. assets have
observed members of a well-known partner security force unit
engaging in clear violations of human rights. Torture, extra-judicial
killings, rape, and other offenses are being clearly displayed on a
screen in front of you. You know immediately that Leahy needs to be
invoked, any standard of proof would be satisfied. After submitting
the necessary reports, and moving through the required processes, the
commander of the at-issue partner nation security forces unit requests
support and assistance. What do you tell him? What can you tell him?
All the details of the incident are classified. You explain to the
commander that the U.S. is immediately terminating all support for his
unit but you cannot tell him why. You cannot tell him anything about
the incident, or what the unit can do to correct the issues. He is Leahybarred, and despite his desire to cooperate and bring the wrong-doers
to justice, he is prohibited from learning a single detail of the violations
that occurred. The unit is now combat ineffective, it is unable to
support itself without U.S. security assistance funds, relations with the
unit, commander, and the partner nation have taken a colossal blow,
and arguably worst of all, the perpetrators cannot be prosecuted,
remaining free to commit additional violations in the future.
The problem detailed above stems from an internal
contradiction in what we will later define to as the “dual purposes” of
the Leahy law: (1) preventing U.S. taxpayer dollars from going to
human rights abusers; and (2) incentivizing partner nations to respect
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human rights and hold violators accountable.132 Both are highly
admirable and, in most cases, they can both be satisfied through the
law’s invocation. However, there can be cases in which the dual
purposes fall into conflict with one another. In these cases, such as the
scenario at the beginning of this section, the U.S. government can only
accomplish one of the two. This is frequently the case when the basis
of the credibility determination is classified. In these cases, there can
be no incentivizing effect as partner nations are prohibited from
knowing why their support is being withheld. Which brings us to the
second proposed change to the law, in those situations where the dual
purposes conflict, decision makers need the flexibility to decide which
purpose is most important.
A. The Dual Purposes of Leahy

During his 2015 remarks to the U.S. Institute of Peace, Senator
Patrick Leahy, the namesake of the Leahy law, discussed the purpose
for which the law was created. “The Leahy Law is narrowly focused,
and it has two distinct but complementary purposes: to shield our
country from complicity in gross violations of human rights; and to
encourage and assist foreign governments in bringing to justice
members of their security forces when those crimes occur.”133 These
“distinct but complimentary purposes”134 are what this Article refers
to as the dual purposes of Leahy.
The first of these dual purposes, which this Article will refer
to as “purity,” is to shield the U.S. from complicity in gross violations
of human rights. According to Senator Leahy, “[w]hen our partners
commit abuses we become complicit—or we are perceived to be
complicit—in the predatory and abusive acts that erode the legitimacy
of those forces.”135 The U.S. must distance itself from these acts and
ensure that taxpayer dollars are not being spent in a fashion that is so
antithetical to American values. In effect, ensuring that the U.S.
132
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remains pure and untainted by complicity in human rights violations.
The second of the dual purposes, which will be referred to as
“incentive,” is to encourage and assist foreign governments in holding
violators accountable and developing systems to prevent abuses from
occurring in the first place. This incentive has both punitive, and
aspirational ends. It is punitive because security forces that commit
human rights violations need to be held accountable, and responsible
individuals need to be prosecuted. In Senator Leahy’s words, we
mustn’t treat violators as “if they are above the law, but by showing
that they have to answer to the law.”136 However, the other end is
aspirational, “the law is punitive . . . But the Law’s larger purpose is
to build professional, disciplined, transparent and accountable security
forces who are sustainable and effective partners for the .”137 We don’t
just want to punish these individuals, units, and nations because they
deserve to be punished, we want to incentivize them to become better,
and to hold themselves to a higher standard.138 According to Tom
Malinowski, assistant secretary of state for democracy, human rights
and labor, this incentive is “the whole point of the Leahy Law”;139 to
make the world a better place.
B. Dueling, Dual Purposes

These “distinct but complementary”140 purposes are both
commendable, and generally, they can both be accomplished through
the use of the Leahy law. Practitioners can ensure that U.S. funds do
not end up in the hands of human rights abusers, and simultaneously
use Leahy-sanctions as an incentive to force partner nations to take
human rights issues more seriously; this would hold individual abusers
accountable. The problem is that not all cases are so simple; and, at
no time is this truer than when classified information is involved.
When the information that forms the basis for a Leahy
violation is classified, practitioners cannot share the information with
136
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units, commanders, or partner nations. This doesn’t matter for
Leahy’s “purity” purpose. The first of Leahy’s dual purposes is
indifferent to the offending nation’s degree of understanding,
knowledge, or ability to address gross violations of human rights. The
only concern is that keeps its hands clean, and that taxpayer dollars
stay out of the pockets of human rights violators. As such, there is no
problem fulfilling these purposes by Leahy-barring a unit without
explaining why.
The second of the dual purposes is not nearly so apathetic;
incentives don’t work in secrecy. Without the ability to share
information with the partner nation or security force, there is no way
to incentivize them to change. There is no way “to build professional,
disciplined, transparent, and accountable security forces who are
sustainable and effective partners for the United States”141 when units
are immediately cut off with little hope of ever being eligible for future
support. “Meanwhile, security Forces are in a ‘catch-22’: they have
no training to improve tactics and ensure human rights compliance,
because they have unresolved human rights allegations due to poor
tactics.”142 Even if there is willingness to take the desired steps,
without knowledge of the underlying incident, there is little that unit
or nation can do. This is no-doubt frustrating and can lead to serious
consequences in achieving the U.S.’ policy objectives and
strengthening bilateral relations with partner nations. As one
practitioner noted, “[d]enial of training, particularly without a
comprehensive explanation, is politically sensitive.”143 Politically
sensitive, indeed.
In their study, the RAND Corporation spoke with a U.S.
official with first-hand knowledge of this type of incident. The
interviewee explained that “tensions arose with the partner nation after
a ‘golden boy’ within the military was tied to derogatory information
and suspended from training. The embassy was unable to provide
details, further upsetting high-ranking military officials.”144 This isn’t
an isolated, or even rare event. This Article’s author witnessed similar
141
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instances during his time in Afghanistan. It is hard enough to explain
to a partner nation that you are withholding well-needed assistance
when you can explain the exact rationale, situations and policies at
play. Without that explanation, it can set relations back immensely,
and make partner nations feel abandoned.
C. The New Rules of the Duel

In situations where the “incentive” purpose is frustrated by an
inability to share information of a violation of human rights, the
current result is that “purity” will always win. If a unit cannot ever
remediate due to an inability to identify the problem, it will be
permanently banned from receiving U.S. assistance. In some cases,
this is the proper result. There are clearly situations where the
violations are widespread, egregious and obvious enough, that the
U.S. must wipe its hands of any involvement, without explanation.
Yet, no matter how strongly one feels about keeping the U.S. pure, in
some cases the ability to preserve the relationship, and the combat
effectiveness of the unit outweighs the consequences. Sometimes,
purity without incentive is not enough. In these cases, when the
“incentive” purpose is frustrated by an inability to share classified
information, Leahy practitioners need a mechanism to decide whether
to continue support despite the substantiated violation.
This Article recommends the addition of the following new
provision in both versions of the Leahy law:
(X) UN-DISCLOSABLE BASIS –
(1) In the event that all the information used by the Secretary of
(State/Defense) to establish probable cause to believe that a security force
unit has committed a gross violation of human rights is un-disclosable to
the
security
force
unit
or
parent
nation,
(2) The Secretary of (State/Defense), or his designee145, may decide to
continue to provide training, equipment, or other assistance,
(3) Provided that there is no way to change the un-disclosable status of
the relied upon information or evidence.
(4) In making this determination, the Secretary of (State/Defense), or his
designee, should consider the following factors:

145
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(A) The unit’s remediation capability, including the sophistication of
the unit’s military justice system, or other similar punitive, investigative
system;
(B) The unit or parent nation’s familiarization with the “Leahy Law;”
(C)The egregiousness of the incident;
(D)The degree of command involvement or condoning of the incident;
(E)The sophistication of the security force’s organizational structure;
and
(F)The National Interest of the United States in maintaining the unit’s
eligibility for security assistance.
(5) No later than 15 days after any such decision, the Secretary of
(State/Defense) shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a
report . . .146
(6) For the purposes of this section “un-disclosable” means that the
security force or partner nation cannot be provided access to the
information or evidence used to substantiate a violation because:
(A) The classified nature of the information or evidence;
(B) The classified nature of the means used to collect the
information or evidence; or
(C) Another existing written policy.

This new provision will provide the necessary operational
flexibility to allow the continued support of key units when doing
so is in the best interests of the U.S. It will also provide an additional
tool to use in the maintenance of bilateral relationships between the
U.S. and a partner nation. This proposed provision is narrowly
tailored enough to avoid abuse while still providing a fair degree of
flexibility. The remainder of this section will move through the
proposed provision and explain the rationale for each subdivision.
1. In the event that all the information . . . is undisclosable . . .

The first paragraph of the provision clarifies that it can only
be invoked when all of the information relied upon is un-
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disclosable. This is important because it prevents the use of the
provision when there is enough disclosable information to explain
the reason why a unit is being Leahy-barred. In situations where
there is both classified and unclassified information that both points
to a violation of human rights, the U.S. is able to explain why
security assistance is being withheld and therefore there is no
conflict between the dual purposes of Leahy.
The use of the term “un-disclosable” instead of the more
specific “classified” allows for greater flexibility in circumstances
where the information relied upon is not classified, but disclosure is
unwarranted or prohibited for some other diplomatic, strategic, or
policy reason. Including these additional grounds within the
definition of the term “un-disclosable” ensures the provision isn’t
too narrowly focused.
2. Provided that there is no way to change the undisclosable status . . .

Paragraph three is intended to prevent the use of the
provision when there is a possibility to change the classification
level, or reassess the policy reason for withholding information from
a partner nation. In the event that a Leahy practitioner can get the
information declassified, there is no longer justification to use this
provision.
3. . . . should consider the following factors . . .

The explicit listing of factors provides Leahy practitioners
with better guidance than using something broader, such as
“National Interest,” to determine whether use of the provision is
necessary. Each factor is selected with Leahy’s dual purposes in
mind. The first two factors are focused on the incentive purpose,
the next two on the purity purpose, and the final two focus on equity
and the U.S.’ interest in the outcome of the decision.
The first two factors look at the incentive purpose and
whether it is truly frustrated. The first factor considers the
sophistication of the unit’s ability to address the issue on its own. If
a security force has a highly sophisticated military justice system or
an active criminal investigative agency, it is likely they will be able
to discover, investigate, and adjudicate the incident on their own.
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The more likely it is the security force will take remediating
measures without U.S. assistance, the less justified the use of this
provision. Essentially, units that are self-motivated do not need
incentives from the U.S. The second factor focuses on the security
force’s familiarity with the Leahy Law. The better a security force
is familiarized, the easier it will be for them to realize the types of
things they need to do to address the underlying incident without
U.S. assistance.
The third and fourth factors focus on the violations
themselves. These two factors are intended to represent the purity
purpose of Leahy, the more egregious the violation, and the more
direct the chain of command involvement, the more important it is
to keep the U.S. away and untainted. If an entire nation’s armed
forces are riddled with human rights abusers at the highest levels of
command, there is little to be gained by continuing a relationship
with a single offending unit. In these cases, a more holistic, national
strategy is likely necessary. In comparison, a single individual’s
actions should not be the basis for loss of support to the entire unit,
especially if the unit would be likely to address the incident if they
knew it occurred. Furthermore, the more egregious an incident, the
more likely the security force will uncover it on their own, or receive
information from another source.
The fifth and sixth factors are focused on the U.S.’ interest.
The fifth factor considers the sophistication of the organizational
structure. As discussed at the beginning of this Article,147 when an
individual commits a violation of human rights, he and his unit
become Leahy-barred. The more sophisticated the organization’s
structure, the better the U.S. is able to minimize the impact of a
single violation. If it can be isolated to a single company, or platoon
sized element,148 it will allow continued security assistance to the
vast majority of non-offending units. If, however, there are poor
distinctions between units, a Leahy violation will likely taint a far
larger group of individuals which may have a more dramatic impact
147
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on bilateral relations and U.S. interests. The final factor asks the
decision maker to broadly assess the U.S. national interest. If there
is nothing to lose, bilateral relations will not be affected, and there
is no military effectiveness threatened, there is little reason to use
this provision.
D. Summation

The Leahy law’s dual purposes are typically able to exist
together in peace. However, sometimes they fall into conflict.
Rather than allowing the law to always choose to serve the purity
purpose by default, decision makers on the ground should be
empowered to assess the situation and decide whether it is more
important to keep the U.S. away from a tainted unit, or to continue
developing and working with the unit to make them a stronger future
partner and promote a stronger relationship with partner nations. In
making this decision, precautions should be taken to prevent abuse
but also provide enough flexibility to ensure that Leahy is being
used as effectively as possible to promote the U.S. National Interest
and the international development of human rights policy.

V. ISSUE 3: STATELY LANGUAGE—DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE
DOS AND DOD VERSIONS OF LEAHY

In the preceding sections of this Article, there have been
multiple references to the differences that exist between the DoD and
DoS version of the law. The primary differences149 are: (1) The
remediation standard; (2) The DoS duty to notify and assist; and (3)
DoD’s “extraordinary circumstances,” disaster relief, humanitarian
aid, and national security exceptions.150 Clearly, there must be an
important reason to differentiate between the standards applied to the
Secretaries of State and Defense, otherwise, why further complicate
149
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conceivably have material impacts on interpretation.
150
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and already complicated law with additional layers of ambiguity? It
is true that there are important differences between the Departments
of State and Defense, both in structure and in mission, but these
differences don’t account for all the discrepancies between the two
versions of the law. Additionally, as the mission of the two
departments overlaps, as has large become the case in Afghanistan and
other modern conflicts, any justification in keeping the standards
different is increasingly weakened. As such, there is no longer a
reason to maintain many of the differences in the laws which is why
this Article’s third recommendation is to remove the unnecessary
differences.
A. Remediation Standard

As explained earlier, remediation is the process by which a
previously Leahy-barred unit is able to regain access to U.S. funding
and support. The standard for remediation is different depending on
the version of the Leahy law. The Department of Defense version
requires that a security force remain barred “unless all necessary
corrective steps have been taken.”151 The Department of State version
applies when the Secretary of State “determines and reports” to
Congress “that the government of such country is taking effective steps
to bring the responsible members of the security forces unit to
justice.”152 Neither version expressly defines what “all necessary
steps” nor “effective steps” would entail. To date, Congress has not
provided any information explaining a rationale for keeping them
separate.
The intent has always been that the two be treated as a single
standard. In a letter sent from Senator Leahy to then Secretary of
Defense William Cohen in 1999, the Senator admitted that the DoS
and DoD Standards were intended to be the same.153 In practice, the
Department of Defense and Department of State have agreed. The two
Departments treat the standards as if they were the identical.154 In a
151

10 U.S.C. § 362 (emphasis added).
22 U.S.C § 2378(d) (emphasis added).
153
SERAFINO, ET AL., supra note 26, at 17 (quoting a letter from Senator
Patrick Leahy to Secretary of Defense William Cohen, January 14, 1999, provided
to CRS by the Senator’s staff).
154
Secretary of Defense Memorandum, supra note 32, at 3.
152

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol31/iss2/4

40

2019]

LEAHY—SHARPENING THE BLADE

539

2015 memorandum issued by Secretary of Defense, Chuck Hagel,
Secretaries of the Military Departments were told that the term
‘appropriate remediation measures’ would be used when describing
the measures necessary for a security forces unit to be remediated.
Military Departments were explicitly told that the new term should be
read to mean ‘all necessary corrective steps’ for purposes of the DoD
Leahy law, and ‘effective steps’ for purposes of the DOS Leahy
law.”155 In effect, the memo erased the difference between the two
versions of the law as a matter of practice.
There are also good policy reasons to unify the language. In a
law as complex as Leahy, and as potentially burdensome, there are
always going to be risks that individuals or organizations try to avoid
its effects. Allowing separate language gives lip-service to the
argument that the standards were intended to mean different things and
as neither standard has ever been expressly defined, an alternative
interpretation could be defended. One example of this occurred in the
early days of the law. Despite Senator Leahy’s clarification letter sent
to Secretary Cohen in 1999, the Secretary disagreed. He felt that the
law could be interpreted in a different way. Cohen wanted to interpret
the law to allow a unit to fulfill remediation requirements by simply
removing an identified violator or violators from a unit, or by ensuring
that that unit received law of war or human rights training.156
Secretary Cohen eventually backed down and, to date, there has never
been an incident of the Department of Defense using an alternative
interpretation of the standard to remediate a Leahy-barred unit;157
however, the opportunity still remains, bolstered by some theories of
statutory construction.158 Should the Secretary of State or Defense
disagree with his or her counterpart’s actions, they have a superfluous
ground to make an argument.
The primary counterargument to all the differences discussed
in this section, is that there are real differences between the missions
155
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of the Department of Defense and that of the Department of State that
warrant discrepancies in standards. Namely, the Department of State’s
aim is diplomacy while the Department of Defense’s is defense.
Traditionally, this has been the case. With that in mind, it would make
sense that the Department of State, interested in maintaining
diplomatic ties, teaching foreign nations to improve, and being
actively involved in security assistance, would only require a few steps
in the right direction to resume support. The Department of Defense,
especially in wartime, has a different role. It doesn’t have the time to
track progress, or encourage continued support. Once a unit is fully
remediated, that is when “all necessary steps” have been taken, the
DoD will resume support, until then it has other things to occupy its
time and resources. If this were still the case, regardless of Senator
Leahy’s original intent, there would be a solid justification in
maintaining the differences. However, over the course of the last few
years, that mission distinction is increasingly no longer the case. 159
The mission of the Department of State and the Department of
Defense has a great degree of overlap in recent conflicts.160 As an
example, look no further than the Afghan Security Forces Fund which
is a direct authorization from Congress for the DoD to engage in
comprehensive security assistance to the ANSF.161 There is also the
change in the NATO mission form ISAF’s combat operations to
Resolute Support’s Train, Advise, Assist (TAA) role. Perhaps due to
the instability of the region, or the poor security situation, the DoD has
taken a much larger role in security assistance. And if that is to remain
in the future, it is better to remove the distinctions in Leahy to reflect
the modern state of affairs.
For these reasons, and unless the Departments of Defense and
State move toward their traditional separate missions, there is little
justification in maintaining the differences in the remediation
language. The intent has always been that the two versions be treated
the same, they are already treated the same as a matter of policy, and
if allowing differences creates an opportunity to undermine the
159
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(Gordon Adams & Shoon Murray, eds., 2014).
160
The overlap in mission set between the two Departments and the
effects on the Leahy law could easily form the basis for additional research but it
is far beyond the scope of this Article.
161
Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2014, supra note 39.
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purpose of the law, that opportunity should be eliminated.
B. Duty to Notify and Assist

The next major difference is that the DoS version of the law
includes the following duty to notify offending nations:
In the event that funds are withheld from any unit pursuant to this section, the
Secretary of State shall promptly inform the foreign government of the basis for
such action and shall, to the maximum extent practicable, assist the foreign
government in taking effective measures to bring the responsible members of the
security forces to justice.162

The Defense version of the law has no equivalent.163 There is
no stated reason why the State version has this provision and the
Defense version does not. Additionally, it has never been well
established how the DoS duty to notify should work in practice.164
The duty to assist is equally vague and there is no information on the
types of assistance that could be offered or the circumstances under
which the assistance may be provided.165 This is unlikely to change.
In 2013, following a GAO report that called attention to the lack of
guidance on the implementation of the duty to inform, the Department
of State replied, “embassies are in the best position to determine the
level and form of notification that will address the requirement.”166 At
the time of publication, there is still no publicly available guidance.
The duty to notify and assist makes sense, especially given its
consistency with one of the dual purposes of the law.167 It incentivizes
nations to hold violators accountable and develop systems to prevent
abuses from occurring.168 As such, it does makes sense to keep the
162

22 U.S.C.S. § 2378d(c).
There is authority for the DoD to provide limited human rights
training to security forces that would otherwise be prohibited, but no further
assistance is authorized. Carl Levin and Howard P. “Buck” McKeon National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015, Pub. L. No. 113-291, 128 Stat.
3292.
164
GAO 13-866, supra note 42, at 11.
165
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166
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duty, and to add it to the DoD version. There is little reason why the
funds withheld from one appropriation should trigger the duty while
the withholding of other funds would not. Further guidance on
implementation is necessary, and it would likely be easier should the
Leahy laws be changed to implement the suggestions this Article
makes in cases where classified or sensitive material is the basis of
credibility determinations.169 Regardless, if Congress decides the
duties to inform and assist are worthwhile, they should appear in both
versions.170
C. Exceptions

The final distinction is the additional exceptions in the DoD
version. In addition to remediation, DoD funds may still be provided
to offending units if the Secretary of Defense, after consultation with
the Secretary of State, determines that it is required by “extraordinary
circumstances” or when the assistance is necessary to assist in
“disaster relief operations or other humanitarian or national security
emergencies.”171 This Article will spend more time analyzing the
necessity and effectiveness of specific Leahy exceptions in Section VI;
however, to the extent that the “extraordinary circumstances” and
“disaster relief” exceptions are retained, it makes little sense to limit
them to one federal department and not the other.
This is especially the case for issues involving disaster relief
humanitarian and national security emergencies. While there was
little discussion in the Congressional record justifying the addition of
these exceptions in 2014,172 there is no reason to more stringently limit
the Department of State’s ability to engage in humanitarian assistance
or disaster relief, even when taking the traditional difference of
mission sets into account. As such, this exception should be added to
169

Id.
Id. (showing that to the extent that the Department of State and
Defense resume their traditional roles, it makes sense for the DoS to take a
mentorship role, and the DoD to cut ties until sufficient progress has been made).
171
10 U.S.C. § 362.
172
S. REP. NO. 113-76, at 183 (2014) (containing the only written
discussion is that “[I]n addition to a waiver for extraordinary circumstances, the
provision would authorize the Secretary of Defense to provide training,
equipment, or other assistance for disaster relief, humanitarian assistance, or
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the DoS version of Leahy in the FAA.
The other exception, for “extraordinary circumstances,” is also
exclusively available to the Department of Defense. This is justifiable
as “extraordinary circumstances” that threaten U.S. national security
may manifest in an endless variety of ways.173 In order to provide the
DoD with necessary operational flexibility in times of war, on while
engaging threats, it is important to never tie the Departments hands
completely when it could otherwise be avoided. On the contrary, DoS
security assistance is typically divorced from these “extraordinary
circumstances” due to its more diplomatic nature. That being said, to
the extent that we are willing to recognize that these “extraordinary
circumstances” exist, and as the approval rests solely at the Secretarial
level, it makes sense to provide an equivalent provision to the
Department of State.
D. Summation

As the law currently exists, there are three primary distinctions
between the Department of State and Department of Defense versions
of the law. These distinctions may have served a deliberate purpose
at one time but they now cause increased confusion in an already
complex system. The remediation standard was never intended to be
different for the two versions, as a matter of policy it is now treated
the same, and to the extent Congress wants to avoid frivolous legal
arguments about the meaning of the distinction, it should be removed.
The duty to inform and assist directly supports one of Leahy’s dual
purposes and there is, therefore, little justification for keeping it out of
the Department of Defense version of the law. Lastly, the exceptions
for humanitarian assistance, national security, and disaster relief
should be included in the Department of State version of the law. To
the extent that Congress thinks we should make exceptions in these
circumstances it shouldn’t matter where the humanitarian aid comes
from. The exception for “extraordinary circumstances” is withheld to
such a high level and used so infrequently, it too could have a
Department of State equivalent with little risk.
If the Departments of Defense and State maintain distinct
missions, and the differences between those missions justify
173

Again, the exact meaning of “extraordinary circumstances” has never
been clearly defined in the Leahy context.
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differences in their respective version of the Leahy law, it makes sense
to maintain distinct standards. However, as the mission between the
agencies begins to overlap, and as the two more frequently work
together when addressing Leahy issues, there is no sense in
maintaining the distinction. Even when ignoring the “mission creep,”
many of the differences between the two versions of the law have no
justification. The Leahy law is complex enough, needless statutory
distinctions do nothing but complicate it even more and should,
therefore, be eliminated.
VI. ISSUE 4: HELPING OUR HELPERS—PROVIDING SECURITY
ASSISTANCE TO FOREIGN FORCES PURSUING U.S. INTERESTS

You are sitting in a conference room listening to a brief about
an increasingly desperate situation. A group of U.S. personnel in
Afghanistan are about to come under attack by an insurgent force
and due to the inequity in numbers, there is no chance they’ll be able
to survive. There aren’t any U.S. forces in the area that will be able
to make it in time but there is a local Afghan National Army unit
only a few kilometers away. Unfortunately, the Afghan unit lacks
necessary arms and equipment to be of any benefit. You know that
you can drop the necessary armaments via air support and ensure
that they arrive in time. Unfortunately, that particular unit is Leahybarred and you are prohibited from equipping them. In a situation
like this, it seems obvious that there needs to be an exception to the
rule. When foreign security forces are working on behalf of U.S.
forces or interests, Leahy sanctions may end up hurting the U.S.
more than the offending unit. There needs to be a mechanism for
providing support in these situations without allowing for a
complete degradation of the Leahy Law’s purpose. This is
increasingly important given how many functions have been handed
over to foreign forces that were traditionally performed by the U.S.
In December of 2014, following more than a decade of
international military operations, the International Security
Assistance Force (“ISAF”) ended combat operations and control of
the NATO mission in Afghanistan and transitioned to Resolute
Support (“RS”).174 RS and ISAF were both charged with training
174
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Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), but unlike RS, ISAF was
also actively engaged in combat operations with the Taliban
Insurgency, a mission that has now been turned over to the ANSF.175
Since the transition from ISAF to RS, the security situation in the
country has not done particularly well.176 In fact, some analysts have
gone as far as stating that the security situation in the country is the
“worst since 2001,” when ISAF and U.S. forces first entered the
country.177 As just one example of this, in May 2017, a truck bomb
detonated near the German Embassy in downtown Kabul killing 92
people and injuring another 450.178 Since the transition, and
subsequent reduction in U.S. and NATO forces, the Taliban have
made alarming gains. As of 2017, only 60% of the country remains
under government control, the rest is either controlled by the
Taliban, ISIS affiliates, or is under dispute.179
In total, U.S. Forces have been reduced from over 100,000
Service members in 2011 to approximately 13,000 in 2017.180 This
means that many of the combat and security-related tasks that were
once directly performed by U.S. and Coalition forces have now been
passed on to the ANSF whose units are now responsible for keeping
175

S.C. Res. 1386, ¶ 9 (Dec. 20, 2001).
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U.S. Forces safe, and for a variety of counter-terrorism efforts that
have a huge impact on U.S. national security interests.181
This is likely a very different situation than the original
Leahy drafters had in mind. In Afghanistan today, security
assistance and support is not being used solely to benefit
Afghanistan, Afghan forces, and Afghan citizens, it is also being
used to benefit the U.S. and its citizens that live and serve within
and outside Afghanistan’s borders. This can place practitioners in a
difficult situation where they must choose between upholding the
law and putting Americans at risk. The solution to this conflict is
this Article’s final recommendation; eliminate the “extraordinary
circumstances” exception in favor of a new mechanism which can
grant flexibility to military commanders when the true beneficiaries
of security assistance to a foreign military unit are U.S interests.
A. Leahy’s Operational Criticism

In December 2013, while giving a speech on human rights
and American interests, the National Security Advisor, Susan E.
Rice, addressed a difficult balance that must be struck in American
foreign policy.182 After stating that the advancement of democracy
and respect for human rights is central in U.S. foreign policy, she
continued with the following:
Yet, obviously, advancing human rights is not and has never been our only
interest. Every U.S. president has a sworn duty to protect the lives and the
fortunes of the American people against immediate threats. That is
President Obama’s first responsibility, and mine. We must defend the
United States, our citizens and our allies with every tool at our disposal,
including, when necessary, with military force. We must do all we can to
counter weapons of mass destruction, aggression, terrorism, and
catastrophic threats to the global economy, upon which our way of life
181
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depends. Anything less would be a dereliction of duty. As we seek to
secure these core interests, we sometimes face painful dilemmas when the
immediate need to defend our national security clashes with our
fundamental commitment to democracy and human rights. Let’s be
honest: at times, as a result, we do business with governments that do not
respect the rights we hold most dear. We make tough choices. When
rights are violated, we continue to advocate for their protection. But we
cannot, and I will not pretend that some short-term tradeoffs do not exist .
. . American foreign policy must sometimes strike a difficult balance—not
between our values and our interests, because these almost invariably
converge with time, but more often between our short and long-term
imperatives.”183

While not specifically mentioning the Leahy Laws by name,
Rice’s comments address one of the Leahy Law’s most common
criticisms. In 2013, on the eve of the U.S. drawdown in
Afghanistan, military leaders, diplomats, and Senator Leahy
gathered to debate the Leahy Law’s role in the country.184 At the
time, as discussed earlier in this section, the Pentagon was working
to train and equip local security services to combat militants so that
American troops didn’t have to.185 Admiral William H. McRaven,
a Navy SEAL who at the time was the commander of U.S. Special
Operations Command, testified that while he supported the spirit of
the law, its enforcement had complicated the nation’s ability to
“train and equip foreign security forces, many of which are now
front-line units fighting Al Qaeda and its affiliates.”186 He added
that while U.S. officials were dedicated to teaching foreign forces
the importance of human rights, the law “has restricted us in a
number of countries across the globe in our ability to train units that
we think need to be trained.”187
Even when an allegation has not yet been confirmed, there
are problems for military commanders. The vetting process can be
incredibly slow, taking weeks or months to verify whether a
183
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violation occurred, and months more to remediate. General John
Kelly, then the Commander of U.S. Southern Command, once stated
that he had to “wait until the State Department sorts these things out
before I can send people in.”188
These concerns are likely the reason that exceptions,
exemptions, and various notwithstanding authorities exist; in some
extraordinary circumstances, we need to assist foreign forces in
order to help ourselves. That being said, the existing exceptions do
not provide much help. Congress has never stated the actual
standard to be applied for the “extraordinary circumstances”
exception,189 and the use of notwithstanding authorities, located in
the ASFF and other similar appropriations, is typically met with
criticism.190 On the other hand, there needs to be meaningful
limitations on these exceptions or else the entire point of the Leahy
law may be frustrated. The proposed solution must provide a
meaningful restraint on abuse while simultaneously addressing the
operational concerns of U.S. military leaders. Luckily, that
mechanism already exists thanks, in part, to a Congressman from
Arkansas named Bill Alexander.
B. Who’s Benefiting Whom? The “Big ‘T’ / Little ‘t’” Method.

As a general rule, the Department of State has the
responsibly, exclusive authority, and appropriated funding to
conduct foreign assistance on behalf of the U.S. Government. This
includes all assistance to foreign military or governments,
development of infrastructure projects, and humanitarian
assistance.191 The Department of Defense may only provide
security assistance using its funds when there is a specific

188
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Congressional authorization,192 or when the funding, while being
provided to train a foreign force, is actually intended to benefit U.S.
military forces; a category of training known as “Little ‘t’ training.”
The distinction between Big ‘T’ Training and Little ‘t’ training is
commonly used by military fiscal attorneys to determine whether
using DoD funds for foreign security assistance is proper. The
distinction traces its roots back to a U.S. Comptroller General
opinion, known as the “Honorable Bill Alexander” decision.193
1. The Ahuas Tara Exercise

In 1983, The Department of Defense commenced Ahuas
Tara, a joint-combined military exercise in Honduras.194 Over the
course of the six-month exercise, 12,000 American Troops
participated in maneuvers alongside the Honduran military.195 The
Department of Defense also built a 3,500 foot airstrip, constructed
nearly 300 wood huts, deployed radar systems, provided medical
assistance to 50,000 Honduran Civilians and veterinary assistance
to 40,000 animals, built a school, and provided training to hundreds
of Honduran military personnel.196 A Congressional delegation, led
by Congressman William “Bill” Alexander, requested that the
Comptroller General of the conduct an investigation to determine
whether it was appropriate for the Department of Defense to conduct
this exercise using its standard operations funds. After a lengthy
discussion, the Comptroller General concluded that many of the
activities carried out by the Department of the Defense were
unlawfully funded and should have been paid through security
assistance funds, within the purview of the Department of State.197
Nonetheless, it was concluded that minor amounts of
interoperability and safety instruction did not constitute “training”
as that term is used in the context of security assistance, and could
192
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therefore be financed with standard DoD Funds.”198
This caveat became known as “Little ‘t’ training,” training
or instruction for foreign forces which had the primary purpose of
promoting interoperability, safety, and/or familiarization with U.S.
military forces. The overall benefit is primarily directed at U.S.
forces, who learn how to fight with and alongside allied militaries,
use allied military equipment, and work in settings they would likely
find themselves should they ever fight on multinational battlefields.
Because the primary beneficiaries in those situations are U.S. forces,
the Comptroller General opined that DoD funds are appropriate.
The alternative became known as “Big ‘T’ Training.” This type of
training consisted of security assistance undertaken to improve a
foreign military force’s operational readiness; the traditional form
of security assistance that must be funded by the Department of
State.199
2. Application to Leahy

This same approach can be used in the Leahy context.
Assuming that a foreign unit is Leahy-barred, military leaders are
currently prohibited from providing any assistance regardless of
their intent in doing so. When the intent is to train, develop, and
mentor units for the benefit of foreign nations, it makes sense to
prohibit security assistance, that’s exactly what the Leahy law is
designed to do. The problem arises when foreign forces are
receiving U.S. assistance and equipment to aid in the pursuit of U.S.
objectives, or to protect and support U.S. forces. These are the
situations that give rise to the complaints and criticisms made by
Ms. Rice, Admiral McRaven, and General Kelly. Just as we would
never bar a U.S. unit or individual from receiving support, we should
not bar foreign forces when they are acting as U.S. surrogates.
The solution is to establish a Leahy equivalent to the Big ‘T’
Little ‘t’ distinction. Dividing “assistance” into Big ‘A’ Assistance
and little “a” assistance grants military commanders the ability to
use funds that would otherwise be prohibited when the beneficiary
of the security assistance is primarily the U.S. Big “A” assistance,
198
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like Big “T” Training, would be defined as “foreign security
assistance primarily undertaken to improve a foreign military
force’s operational readiness.”200 This is traditional security
assistance that the Leahy law was intended to prohibit when there is
a confirmed gross violation of human rights. This will be
distinguished from “Little ‘a’ assistance” which would be limited to
assistance that primarily benefits the U.S.
3. Factors of Consideration

In order to assist in this determination under the Big ‘T’/
little ‘t’ training paradigm, a number of factors have been
established to assist practitioners.201 Similarly, the Big ‘A’ little ‘a’
distinction could rely on the following: (1) relationship between the
U.S. and the foreign force; (2) the location the assistance will take
place; (3) the amount of benefit received by the foreign force; and
(4) the past performance of the foreign force. These could either be
written directly into the statute, or established elsewhere in
administrative policy. The following paragraphs in this section will
summarize each of these factors and how they would be used to
determine the primary beneficiary of the proposed assistance.
The first factor is the relationship between the U.S. and the
foreign security force that will be receiving the security assistance.
This factor is intended to demonstrate the degree to which the
foreign force is acting as a U.S. surrogate. On one end of the
spectrum are forces that integrated into a U.S. chain of command.
In some situations, foreign forces work directly alongside U.S.
armed forces, following U.S. orders, and executing joint missions.
On the other end of the spectrum are forces that are wholly
independent, that are not subject to U.S. oversight or guidance, and
function largely as if they were independent contractors. The closer
the relationship, and the more the U.S. relied on the unit in the
pursuit of U.S. objectives, the better justification for categorizing
the support as “Little ‘a’ assistance. This factor should also consider
relative advancement of the foreign security force. The regular
200
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armed forces of a sovereign state should be held to a higher standard
than a local militia that does not have the benefit of regular human
rights training or a developed understanding of the Rule of Law.
The next factor considers the location the assistance will take
place, the closer to active hostilities, and the more likely U.S. forces
will be at risk, the more likely the U.S. is the primary beneficiary.
Practitioners could consider whether there is a designated
International Armed Conflict (IAC), a Non-international Armed
Conflict (NIAC), or whether the hostile forces were undeclared.
This factor would also take into account any available information
on the current security situation. The more dependent U.S. forces
are on foreign security and protection, the more likely they should
qualify as little ‘a’ assistance.
Third would be the degree to which the foreign security force
benefits from the assistance. This would be measured by the
cumulative cost of the assistance, the duration, and the breadth of
the benefit. Providing foreign security forces with large, expensive
equipment or new construction will likely have a benefit well after
the immediate benefit to the U.S. has ended and therefore increases
the overall benefit received by the foreign security force.
Furthermore, the analysis should consider whether the beneficiary
would be another sovereign nation as a whole or a regional or local
force or militia. For assistance that would benefit an allied nation
as a whole rather than a specific Leahy-barred unit, there is a
stronger argument in allowing the support as less of the benefit will
be received by the barred unit.
The final factor is the past performance of the unit. This
would encompass the severity of the human rights violation,
whether it was an isolated incident, and whether the unit has taken
any steps to address it. If a unit has been taking steps to remediate,
or hold the responsible individuals accountable, but has not yet
satisfied the Leahy’s remediation standard, it strengthens the
justification in providing assistance.
By using these factors, decision makers will be better able to
determine whether proposed assistance will primarily benefit the
U.S., or, the foreign Leahy-barred unit. This analysis will allow for
continued security assistance support to forces that the U.S. depends
on for the protection and security of U.S. forces and interests.
Foreign forces directly responsible for providing security or aid in a
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role that would typically be fulfilled by the U.S., serving in an area
with active contingencies, that would only receive minimal longterm assistance, will be eligible for necessary little ‘a’ assistance.
Conversely, repeat offenders within allied armed forces, working
independently of U.S. forces in an area free of hostilities and likely
to receive extensive, costly support would remain barred as
recipients of Big ‘A’ Assistance.
4. Mitigating the Risks

The greatest risk in changing the mechanism from
“extraordinary circumstances” to the method detailed above, is that
it there is a chance the exception could swallow the rule. There is
an argument that everything that the DoD does is intended to benefit
national security, otherwise, it would not be the DoD’s role at all.
In order to mitigate that risk, the exception would have to be
reserved for the strategic, rather than tactical level.202 To do this, all
that is necessary is to require a high-level approval authority for the
exception. Like “extraordinary circumstances,” it could be reserved
to the Secretary of Defense, or, delegated as far as the Combatant
Commanders.203 This will ensure that the exception is not relied
upon unless there is a legitimate need to do so. There should also
be a Congressional notification requirement, like the current statute
already has.204 It is also important to note that this exception would
only allow the DoD to continue funding a foreign unit in support of
its mission. Nothing would prevent the full investigation,
prosecution, and punishment of responsible parties.

202

Strategic, Operational, and Tactical are the three levels of war. The
strategic level focuses on the outcome of a war as a whole. Tactical, on the other
hand, focuses instead on individual maneuvers and battles on the smallest scale.
U.S. Armed Forces, Joint Publication 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the
United
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(2013),
https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp1_ch1.pdf.
203
Commanders of Combatant Commands (COCOMs), geographic
multi-service commands that report directly to the Secretary of Defense and the
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C. Summation

As National Security Advisor Rice said in 2013, the U.S.
sometimes faces painful dilemmas requiring choices between the
need to defend our national security interests and our ongoing,
fundamental commitment to democracy and human rights.205 These
potential conflicts were likely the reason why an “extraordinary
circumstances” exception was included in the DoD’s version of the
law from the start. However, despite the existence of this exception,
senior military leaders have still attested to difficulties navigating
the tension between these values. In order to arm our military
leaders with the tools needed to keep our interests and
Servicemembers safe, while being true to the principles that form
the basis for the Leahy laws, we need to provide sufficient
operational flexibility to allow them to decide how to handle
difficult situations. By changing from a vaguely defined exception
to a methodology based in existing law, military commanders, and
those advising them, will be better able to simultaneously protect
American principals, and the Soldiers that defend them.
VII. CONCLUSION

Each of the recommendations listed in this Article could be
further expanded upon and form the basis for further research. The
intent of this Article is to demonstrate that there is a divide between
the original intent of the Leahy Law and the way the law operates in
effect. Armed with decades of lessons learned and data gathered
from Leahy practitioners, Congress should update the law to ensure
that the intent and effect are better aligned.206 By setting the
205

Rice, supra note 182.
While the thesis of this paper is that statutory amendments in
Congress is the best mechanism to make these changes, much can be done as a
matter of policy. Lacking a statutory definition, the Departments of State and
Defense can order practitioners to interpret “credible evidence” to mean “probable
cause;” they can interpret extraordinary circumstances to invoke the reasoning in
the “Honorable Bill Alexander” decision from GAO, and they can consider the
dual purposes when making credibility, remediation, and notwithstanding
decisions. This may also galvanize Congress to correct deficiencies in the new
interpretations which may lead to the Congressional, statutory solution that is
ultimately preferred. This Article is also silent on the role of Congressional
politics or partisan polarity and how that would affect implementation of the
206

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol31/iss2/4
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standard of proof in Leahy cases as “credible information,”
Congress intended to specify the types of evidence to be considered;
however, without clear guidance on what that standard means, and
how to handle difficult cases, practitioners cannot hope to properly
assess violations. Without the discretion to choose between Leahy’s
dual purposes, practitioners and commanders lose the operational
flexibility necessary to select the optimal objectives when a conflict
arises. While differences between the Department of State and
Defense may have once justified distinctions in their versions of the
law, that justification has been weakened as the mission of the two
has become increasingly overlapped, and as decisions are more
often being made by inter-agency committees. Finally, while the
original drafters always recognized the need for flexibility in
Leahy’s application in order to prevent disproportionate harm to the
U.S. national security in certain “extraordinary circumstances,” the
mechanisms chosen lack the practical effectiveness or guidance that
is necessary to be used properly or deliberately.
This by no means excuses the problems that have been
occurring in the law’s implementation. The processing times are too
long, the tracking system, INVEST, is too convoluted, and the role
of the Department of Defense is too marginalized. These should all
be reexamined, and upgrades to the statute should be matched with
upgrades the policies, programs, and processes that are currently in
place. Many of the sources cited in this Article contain a myriad of
great suggestions that would increase Leahy’s functionality.
However, these administrative changes will ultimately be futile if
some of the fundamental problems identified in this Article are not
solved. We need to improve the heart of the law and not just its
application.
There is no doubt that the Leahy law is a critical part of the
United States’ foreign policy and that its aim warrants continued
effort to achieve. However, we should not fear revisiting the
original intentions now that we have seen how it operates in the real
world. It must be continually improved or risk becoming an empty
remnant of its former self, or worse, become the operational burden
that its critics espouse. America needs to be a world leader in the
proposed amendments as it would be outside the scope of this Article and likely
warrant extensive scholarship on its own.
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area of human rights but it requires functional tools in order to do so
and when it comes to Leahy, Congress needs to sharpen the blade.
It is the author’s hope that, by implementing the statutory changes
presented in this Article, it can do just that.
***
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